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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cet article tente d'expliquer pourquoi les réformes efficaces ne sont pas effectuées quand 
les gens qui en sont lésés ont le pouvoir de les bloquer, et ce, même quand des schémas de 
compensation sont possibles. Nous proposons un modèle de "signaling" avec information 
incomplète bilatérale dans lequel le gouvernement a besoin d'effectuer deux réformes de 
façon séquentielle en négociant avec des groupes d'intérêt. La formation des groupes d'intérêt 
est endogène, les compensations sont distorsionnaires et les types de gouvernement se 
soucient différemment des distorsions. Nous montrons que, lorsque les compensations sont 
informatives à propos du type de gouvernement, il y a un biais contre le paiement de 
compensations et la réalisation des réformes. Ceci est dû au fait que le paiement de 
compensations élevées aujourd'hui donne des incitations à certains groupes d'intérêt de 
s'organiser et de bloquer la réalisation de réformes subséquentes, avec le seul but d'obtenir 
des transferts. En payant des compensations plus basses, le gouvernement tente d'éviter 
l'organisation de ce genre de groupes d'intérêt. Cependant, ceci implique aussi que certaines 
réformes soient bloquées par des groupes d'intérêt ayant des pertes relativement élevées. 
 
Mots clés : réformes, groupes d'intérêt, compensations, réputation 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out 
when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them 
is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a 
government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with 
interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are 
distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, 
when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a 
bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is 
because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to 
organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By 
paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from 
organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups 
with relatively high losses. 
 
Key words : reforms, interest groups, compensations, reputation 
1 Introduction
Economists have long been puzzled by the fact that e!ciency-enhancing reforms are often
not implemented. What seems puzzling is that the status quo prevails over reforms that
produce beneﬁts in excess of costs and for which mechanisms to compensate losers are
feasible. The goal of this paper is to propose an explanation for this paradox.
The literature that has addressed the issues of economic policy reform (Fernandez and
Rodrik (1991)), technology adoption (Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) and Parente and Prescott
(1994, 1997)) and endogenous ﬁscal policy in growth models (Persson and Tabellini (1994),
Bertola (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994)) has shown that, if losers have enough power
to prevent the change, economies will remain stuck at ine!cient equilibria. A Coasian
argument, however, suggests that if transaction costs were su!ciently low, losers could be
compensated and e!ciency would necessarily be attained. High transaction costs are then,
sometimes implicitly, invoked as reasons why compensations are not feasible and reforms
not carried out.
In this paper we explicitly formalize some of these transaction costs. Our starting point
is the observation that reform processes have a sequential nature. Even in historical cases
of “big bangs,” as in Poland at the beginning of the 90’s, the reform process has extended
over a few years. If governments dier in their willingness to compensate losers and if this
is private information, compensation payments may become a signaling device.
We capture these insights in a signaling model, in the spirit of Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982). A government faces the task of sequentially imple-
menting two e!cient reforms by bargaining with the losers from each reform. Losers may
block the implementation of a reform by organizing, at a cost, as an interest group. The
government oers compensations to induce an interest group to accept the reform. Interest
groups are heterogenous in their loss from the reform and their cost of organizing. Since
the decision to organize is endogenous, it will depend, among other things, on the amount
of compensations the interest group expects to receive from the government.
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Under “informational linkages” (Fudenberg and Kreps (1987)) - where the losers from
the second reform can observe a government’s ﬁrst period compensation oer - a govern-
ment may have an incentive to build a reputation of “toughness” by making a relatively low
oer to the losers from the ﬁrst reform. In the second period, a government’s reputation
for toughness pays o by discouraging some losers from organizing and opposing the im-
plementation of the second reform. Under “informational isolation” - where no ﬁrst period
event can be observed - reputational concerns are not present.
We show that in all the equilibria of the model that satisfy a reasonable restriction
on beliefs, there is a bias against the implementation of reforms and the payment of com-
pensations. Speciﬁcally, the ex-ante probability of implementing the ﬁrst reform and the
expected amount of compensations paid in the ﬁrst period of every equilibrium are lower
under informational linkages than under informational isolation. Similar results also hold,
under some conditions, for the second period path of play of every equilibrium.
The ex-ante probability of carrying out the ﬁrst reform decreases because the govern-
ment’s reduced propensity to compensate increases the likelihood that its oer is rejected by
the ﬁrst interest group. More interestingly, in the second period, the eect of reputation on
the organization of losers does not necessarily translate into a higher probability of imple-
menting the reform. In fact, losers that are discouraged from organizing would be, instead,
just seeking transfers from the government and would not oppose the implementation of the
reform. In our model, governments sacriﬁce e!ciency in the ﬁrst period in order to obtain
a larger share of the surplus produced by the second reform. E!ciency is thus traded-o
for distribution.
These results show how the presence of informational linkages across periods can, by
itself, introduce a bias against the implementation of reforms and the payment of com-
pensations. In this respect, the paper provides a partial justiﬁcation for the simplifying
assumption, introduced by the papers mentioned above, of exogenously ruling out side pay-
ments to losers.
We also view our explanation of the status quo bias as complementary to those advanced
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by other papers that have explicitly modelled some of the transaction costs involved in
compensating losers from reform.
One type of transaction costs, proposed by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Besley
and Coate (1998), emphasizes the absence of commitment on the side of policymakers as
one of the main problems with compensations.1 In these models, a majority of agents today
votes against the implementation of an e!cient reform because it foresees that tomorrow a
potentially dierent majority will not have the incentive to compensate it for its losses.
We share the view that commitment devices are generally not available to policymakers
in the real world. In our model, if governments could commit to a compensation scheme at
the outset of the reform process, reputational issues would not play any role since interest
groups would not base their organization decision on expected compensations. Casual evi-
dence suggests, however, that governments often ﬁnd themselves forced to renege on their
original intentions once faced with enough pressure from powerful interest groups. In a
world without commitment devices, such as ours, reputational concerns are bound to play
an important role whenever reforms have to be implemented sequentially.
A point in which we depart from this literature is that the political model we describe
does not feature democratic voting as a means of aggregating the preferences of losers and
winners from reform. In the model we propose, instead, winners and losers interact by
bargaining over the surplus generated by the reform and losers, if they decide to organize,
can block the implementation of a reform. This modelling choice reﬂects the fact that many
reforms produce costs that are concentrated on a minority of losers, whereas the beneﬁts
are spread across the whole population. It thus seems likely that losers organize as pressure
groups, while winners rely on the government to defend their interests.
Another sort of transaction costs, suggested by Dewatripont and Roland (1992), focuses
on the implications of private information about the losers’ characteristics for the timing
1Absence of commitment on the side of policymakers has also been stressed by Dixit and Londregan
(1995) as a reason why e!cient economic decisions are not undertaken. In their model competing political
parties cannot commit not to make transfers according to agents’ political characteristics, which reduces the
rewards from e!cient economic decisions.
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of reform implementation. In their model a government faces the problem of reducing the
size of a public sector, by inducing heterogenous workers to leave by means of compensa-
tions. Workers dier in terms of their disutility of work, which is private information. This
informational constraint may induce the government to implement a partial reform, rather
than a full one, to minimize the rents conceded to workers. As Dewatripont and Roland,
we also assume that losers from reform have private information about their characteristics.
However, the key element of our analysis is the assumption that the government’s type is
private information as well.
At the end of the paper we discuss an example that illustrates some of the key assump-
tions and mechanisms of our model: the current peace process in Colombia. In 1998, the
Colombian government of Andres Pastrana initiated a reform process by sequentially bar-
gaining with the country’s two most powerful guerrilla groups. After the ﬁrst group received
a generous compensation package from the government to sit at the bargaining table, the
second one staged a campaign of political violence to obtain a similar deal. In the paper we
argue that this example points to the importance of reputational concerns in a world where
reforms are implemented sequentially and governments cannot commit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibria in two useful benchmarks: public information about the government and
private information about the government in the absence of informational linkages across
periods. Section 4 analyzes the equilibria of the model when the government’s type is private
information and periods are informationally linked. In this section we also characterize and
show the existence of separating and pooling equilibria. Section 5 describes the eects of
reputation on reforms and compensations. Section 6 discusses the Colombian example in
detail. Section 7 concludes. We refer to the Appendix for the proofs of the results.
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2 The Model
In this model a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two economic re-
forms by bargaining with two interest groups, one for each reform.2 The objective of the
government is the maximization of the discounted monetary surplus produced by the re-
forms, net of compensations to interest groups and the distortions they cause. Interest
groups are heterogeneous in terms of their evaluation of the status quo and the cost of
organizing themselves, which are both private information.
At the beginning of each period the concerned interest group has to decide whether to
organize (in the following “enter”), at a cost. If the cost is not undertaken (“stay out”)
the interest group does not have any power to aect the outcome of the reform process. If
it decides to organize, instead, it acquires the power to block the reform. After the entry
decision has been taken the interest group receives a take-it-or-leave-it compensation oer
from the government which it can accept or reject. In case of acceptance, the reform is
implemented and compensations are paid. Otherwise the reform is blocked if the interest
group has chosen to organize itself.
The sequential nature of the game depends on the amount of information about the
government’s type that the ﬁrst round of negotiations conveys to the second interest group.
If negotiations occur under “informational isolation”, the game is equivalent to one in which
reforms are carried out simultaneously. Under “informational linkages”, instead, the second
interest group can observe a government’s ﬁrst period compensation oer. In the real world,
it is likely that the process of implementing reforms has a sequential nature. By “sequential”
we mean that the time span between the implementation of two reforms is long enough for
interest groups to be able to organize themselves.
We denote by i = 1, 2 both a reform and the concerned interest group.
Government
2 In the following, we use the expression “interest groups” to indicate losers from reform both in the case
they decide to organize and in the case they do not. Of course interest groups that do not organize will not
have any power to block a reform.
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The government’s utility function is
E
"
2X
i=1
i31Ii (v  ci)
#
where Ii = 1 if reform i is implemented and 0 otherwise and where  5 (0, 1] is a discount
factor. The parameter v represents the monetary surplus generated by each reform and
ci denotes the compensations that the government oers to interest group i. We view
compensations in a broad sense: ci may represent a direct monetary payment from the
government to the interest group or the monetary value of any legislation act that would
beneﬁt the interest group.
The payment of compensations entails two kinds of cost for a government, which are
captured by the parameter   1. First, we assume that the government cares only about
the rest of society, not about interest groups, since it is the general public that will be
responsible for its reelection. Each dollar transferred to interest groups therefore reduces
the government’s payo by a dollar.
Second, we postulate that there is an additional cost of making transfers for a govern-
ment. This cost could be due to the fact that compensations are simply distortionary, as
in Dewatripont and Roland (1992). In this case   1 would represent the welfare cost of
raising one dollar of side payments or of enacting legislation that favors interest groups.3
Alternatively, governments may be concerned about being perceived by the general public
to favor the particular interest group they are compensating, as in Coate and Morris (1995).
In this case,   1 would represent any such cost to the government arising because of
making transfers to special interests.4 We interpret  as summarizing these costs of making
transfers and refer to it simply as a government’s “willingness to compensate.”
We assume that interest groups cannot directly observe a government’s willingness to
compensate. Dierences in  will be associated to unequal access by governments to e!cient
3The speciﬁcation of the government’s preferences implies that only resources generated by the imple-
mentation of the reform will be used in paying compensations. Any compensation scheme is thus necessarily
consistent with a balanced budget.
4 In Coate and Morris (1995), when governments face such reputational concerns, they might resort to
disguised and often ine!cient compensation schemes. However, also in their model, reputational concerns
can induce governments not to make neither direct nor disguised transfers to interest groups.
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transfer mechanisms, or to their dierent concerns about compensating special interests.
We consider two types of government denoted by s (“strong” type) and w (“weak” type),
where we normalize w = 1 and let s = t > 1. Notice that the “strong” type is relatively
less willing to compensate than the “weak” one.5 The prior distribution of  is common
knowledge: a government is strong with probability q 5 [0, 1] and weak with probability
1 q.
Our key interest will be to investigate how the sequential nature of the reform process
interacts with the fact that (i) governments dislike compensating interest groups per se, and
that (ii) their willingness to compensate is private information.
Interest Groups
We assume interest group i only cares about reform i. An interest group is a collection
of agents that would suer a loss in the case a reform were implemented and which has
the power to block it, at a cost.6 We do not analyze the sources of this power. What we
have in mind is the capacity of interest groups (unions, lobbies, etc.) to aect the outcomes
of political processes by inﬂuencing the public opinion, government’s o!cials and by not
providing their sometimes essential cooperation to the successful implementation of reforms.
Interest groups have linear utility functions. They are indexed by the couple of param-
eters (, k) which is private information. The parameter  represents the utility that an
interest group derives from the status quo. It has a prior distribution which is uniform on
the unit interval, i.e.,   U [0, 1] . We view the assumption that  is private information
as a realistic feature of our model, since it seems likely that an interest group has more
information than a government on the way it may be aected by a reform.7
The parameter k represents the cost an interest group has to incur in order to organize
itself as such and be able to participate in the negotiations. It represents dierent types
of expenditures the interest group may incur: costs related to organization, collection of
5The labels “strong” and “weak” refer simply to the equilibrium behavior we anticipate for each govern-
ment type in terms of compensation oers.
6Qualitatively similar results would follow if we assumed that the government could still implement the
reform with some exogenous probability after a rejection of its compensation oer by the interest group.
7 It could be argued that interest groups may signal their losses to the government in order to be com-
pensated. We take the view that this type of signaling would typically be costly and thus imperfect.
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information, public relations, etc. As we mentioned above, if this cost is not borne, interest
groups cannot credibly threaten to block the reform, because of lack of organization. The
cost k has a prior distribution which is uniform on the unit interval, i.e., k  U [0, 1] . We
assume that  and k are independently distributed.8
For convenience we deﬁne a variable ei which takes a value of 1 if interest group i decided
to organize and 0 otherwise. We summarize the payo of an interest group (, k) in Table
1, where c1 represents compensations paid by the government to the interest group if it
organizes and c0 the compensations if it does not organize.
Table 1 - Payo of Interest Group (, k) .
Reform Implemented Reform Not Implemented
e = 1 c1  k  k
e = 0 c0 
E!cient Reforms
Reforms are assumed to produce aggregate beneﬁts in the sense of Besley and Coate
[1998]: a reform is e!cient if there exists a compensation scheme that makes both the
aected interest group and the government better-o with respect to a status quo charac-
terized by no reform. The following assumption guarantees that all the reforms we consider
are e!ciency enhancing:
Assumption 1. v  t.
A government of type  prefers a reform over the status quo if and only if v  c. As long
as c = 1 all interest group types are better-o if the reform is implemented. A government of
type  is better-o as long as v   . Since t > 1, Assumption 1 guarantees that the reform
can result in a Pareto improvement.
In order to avoid the trivial case in which the surplus produced by reforms is so large
that, under public information about the government, both types would always want to
compensate all interest groups, we assume the following
8The assumption that both b and k are private information of interest groups is essential to demonstrate
the role played by informational linkages in the reform process. Footnote 11 below provides an intuition for
why this is the case.
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Assumption 2. v < 2.
Strategies and Equilibrium
We limit our analysis to pure strategy equilibria. A strategy for a government of type 
facing entry levels e1 and e2 consists of ﬁrst and second period compensation oers condi-
tional on entry. A strategy for an interest group i of type (, k) is an entry decision ei and
a decision of whether to accept or reject a compensation oer ci.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a strategy and beliefs for the government
and a strategy and beliefs for each of the two interest groups, such that: i) the government’s
strategy is sequentially optimal given its beliefs and the interest groups’ strategies; ii) each
interest group’s strategy is sequentially optimal given its beliefs and the government’s strat-
egy; iii) government’s beliefs are consistent with interest groups’ strategies, in the sense
that they are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever it is possible; iv) interest groups’ beliefs are
consistent with the government’s strategy, in the sense that they are derived from Bayes’
rule whenever it is possible.
3 Notation and Equilibria in Two Benchmark Games
We consider three cases which dier according to the informational structure of the game.
First we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (from now on “equilibrium”) of the game
under public information about the government. Second, we consider the equilibrium of the
game under incomplete information about the government when there is no informational
linkages between reforms. These exercises establish two useful benchmarks with which we
can compare the equilibria of the game under private information about the government
and informational linkages between reforms. This analysis will allow us to isolate the eects
of the sequential nature of reforms on compensations and reform implementation.
3.1 Public Information about the Government
Under public information about the government’s type, dynamic considerations do not play
any role since the government faces a randomly drawn interest group’s type in each period.
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We begin by describing the entry decision of an interest group of type (, k) when the
government has generic type  . First of all, notice that if it does not enter, it receives
no compensations since it does not have any power to block the implementation of the
reform. An interest group of type (, k) , which anticipates to receive an oer cW from the
government, is going to enter if and only if9
max {cW  k, k}  0.
This condition implies that all interest groups characterized by   k or k  cW will
enter. Interest groups characterized by   k decide to enter independently from the
expected amount of compensations. Interest groups characterized by  < k, instead, enter
only if expected compensations are large enough to cover the cost of organization. Thus a
government that is willing to oer higher compensations will attract more interest groups
that organize with the only purpose of receiving this transfer.
We denote the set of interest group types that decide to enter by
AcW = {(, k) s.t. k  c
W
 or   k} .We will also use this set in the analysis of the equilibria
of the sequential game. It is represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 - Entry under Public Information about the Government’s Type.
We now analyze the game given entry. From the previous discussion it follows that the
only consistent beliefs of the government about the type of interest group that decided to
enter are represented by the uniform distribution over the set AcW .
9We are assuming, without loss of generality, that an interest group will enter if indierent.
11
An interest group of type (, k) that entered and is facing a compensation oer c will
accept it if c   and will reject otherwise.10 Upon entry, a government of type  makes a
compensation oer
cpb = argmaxc
V (c; c
W
 )(1)
where V (c; c
W
 ) is the expected utility of a government of type  that oers c when entry
is characterized by the set AcW . We restrict the analysis to c 5 [0, 1] since c > 1 is clearly
suboptimal from the government’s perspective. Expected utility is given by
V (c; c
W
 ) = (v  c) (c; c
W
 )
where vc represents the net gain to the government from implementing a reform and pay-
ing c in compensations and  (c; cW ) represents the government’s subjective probability that
its oer c is going to be accepted, conditional on entry, as characterized by AcW . Formally,
 (c; cW ) =
(
2cWc if 0  c  cW

h
c2 + (cW )
2
i
if cW < c  1
where  =  (cW ) = 1/
h
1 + (cW )
2
i
. In Figure 1, the graphical interpretation of  (c; cW ) is
the area below c in the set AcW . In equilibrium, consistency of beliefs requires that c
pb
 = cW .
Our results are summarized in the following
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium path of play of the game under public information
about  , only interest groups in the set A
cpb
enter. Upon entry, a government of type
 oers
cpb =
v
2
.
Among interest groups that entered, this oer is accepted by those characterized by
(, k) such that   cpb and rejected otherwise. If a government does not observe
entry, it implements the reform at no cost.
Notice that Assumption 2 guarantees that cpb < 1 for both government’s types.11
10We assume, without loss of generality, that the interest group accepts when indierent.
11At this point we can provide an intuition for why we need both b and k to be private information to be
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3.2 Private Information about the Government under No Informational
Linkages
Suppose now that the interest groups do not know the government’s type. With no informa-
tional linkages between reforms the whole game is reduced to two independent static games.
This can be interpreted as a situation in which reforms are carried out simultaneously.
We again start our analysis from the entry decision of interest groups. Since they do not
know the government’s type, they will base their decision on expected utility. An interest
group of type (, k) is going to enter if and only if
qmax {cWs  k, k}+ (1 q)max {c
W
w  k, k}  0(2)
where, as before, cW denotes the interest group’s conjecture about the oer it is going to
receive from a type  government in case of entry. The condition above makes use of the
fact that no government compensates interest groups that do not organize.
Notice that, as under public information about the government, all interest groups whose
evaluation of the status quo  is greater than the organization cost k decide to enter inde-
pendently from the amount of compensations they expect to receive.
Consider now interest groups such that  < k. Since the max is a convex function,
Jensen’s inequality implies that the left-hand side of equation (2) is weakly greater than
max {cW  k, k} where cW = qcWs + (1 q) cWw. When  < k, the condition
max {cW  k, k}  0 is satisﬁed by interest groups with k  cW. The intuition for this
result is simple. Since the utility of interest groups is linear in compensations and they can
always keep the status quo by rejecting the compensation oer, interest groups are “risk
lovers”. This explains why all types whose cost of entry is below or equal to expected com-
able to demonstrate the role played by informational linkages in the reform process. Consider, for example,
the case where k is a known constant. Under public information about the government, two situations then
arise: 1) All interest group types in [0, 1] organize independently of the government’s type; 2) Only interest
group types in [k, 1] organize if the government is strong, while all types in [0, 1] organize if the government
is weak. Situation 1) is not useful for our purposes because it implies that there are no gains from being
perceived as strong rather than weak; thus there would be neither separating nor pooling equilibria in the
game under informational linkages. Situation 2) does not suer from this drawback, but is not consistent
with our Assumption 1 (e!cient reforms). The choice of modeling k as private information allows us to
make entry by interest groups a function of the government’s type, without violating the assumption that
all reforms are e!cient.
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pensations decide to organize. Moreover, it also explains why types with cWw > k > c
W and
k >  > cWs choose to enter as well. Formally, in this case, if cWw > cWs, equation (2) is satisﬁed
if   [k  (1 q) cWw] /q.12
We denote the set of interest group types that decide to enter by
BcWs ,cWw = {(, k) s.t.   k or k  c
W or   [k  (1 q) cWw] /q} . This set will also be used
in the analysis of the equilibria of the sequential game. It is represented in Figure 2 in the
case cWw < 1.
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Figure 2 - Entry under Private Information about the Government’s Type.
Consider now the problem of a government of type  , given entry. As before, consistent
beliefs require that it conjectures that interest groups that decide to enter are uniformly
distributed on BcWs ,cWw . Given these beliefs the government oers
cnl = argmaxc
V (c; c
W
s, c
W
w)(3)
where V (c; c
W
s, c
W
w) is the expected utility of a type  government that oers compensations
c, when entry is characterized by the set BcWs ,cWw . It is given by, for c 5 [0, 1]
V (c; c
W
s, c
W
w) = (v  c) (c; c
W
s, c
W
w)
where  (c; cWs, cWw) represents the probability that the oer c is accepted conditional on entry
12The opposite conjecture cWw $ cWs can never be veriﬁed in equilibrium.
14
as described by BcWs ,cWw . Formally,
 (c; cWs, c
W
w) =
;
A?
A=
2cWc if 0  c  cWs
2
h
ccW + q2 (c c
W
s)
2
i
if cWs < c  cWw
1 
¡
1 c2
¢
if cWw < c  1
where  =  (cWs, cWw) = 1/
h
1 + q (cWs)
2 + (1 q) (cWw)
2
i
. In Figure 2, the graphical interpre-
tation of  (c; cWs, cWw) is the area below c in the set BcWs ,cWw . In equilibrium, consistency of
beliefs requires that cnls = c
W
s and c
nl
w = c
W
w.
The solution for the weak government turns out to be
cnlw = min
(
v
4 q
"
1 +
r
1
q (4 q)
4t2
#
, 1
)
.
In the rest of the paper we will concentrate on the region of the parameter space for which
cnlw = 1 because the analysis of the game under informational linkages is much simpler in
this case, without changing any of our results.13 The necessary and su!cient condition for
cnlw = 1 is then given by
Assumption 3. 4(13v/2)
13(v/2t)2
 q  1.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium under informational isolation when param-
eters satisfy Assumption 3.
Proposition 2. In the unique equilibrium path of play of the game under “informational
isolation”, only interest groups in the set Bcnls ,cnlw enter. Upon entry, a strong govern-
ment oers
cnls =
v
2t
and a weak government oers
cnlw = 1.
Among interest groups that entered, cnl is accepted by those characterized by (, k)
such that   cnl and rejected otherwise. If a government does not observe entry, it
implements the reform at no cost.
13We provide an analysis of the case under which cnlw < 1 in Castro and Coen-Pirani (2001).
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The proposition illustrates the fact that under “informational isolation” the compensa-
tion scheme oered by a weak government is larger than under public information. This
is due to the fact that, when going from public to private information about the govern-
ment, the risk of facing a strong type of government induces some interest groups with low
evaluation of the status quo not to organize. Consequently a weak type has an incentive to
increase its compensation oer in the economy with private information because it does not
need to worry about these inframarginal interest groups.
3.3 Sources of Ine!ciency under Informational Isolation
The sources of ine!ciency under informational isolation are standard in this type of frame-
work. The key element why some e!cient reforms are not implemented in the context of
the previous two sections is the fact that  is private information. If  was known, the
government would make an oer c =  in case of entry, which would always be accepted. In
this case all reforms would be implemented, whether the government’s type is private infor-
mation or not. Since the government does not know , but only its distribution, and since
compensations are distortionary, it will not ﬁnd it optimal in general to always implement
the reform by oering c = 1. Consequently, some interest group types characterized by a
high  will reject the government’s oer and block the reform.
As mentioned in the introduction, the model developed by Dewatripont and Roland
(1992) is similar, in this particular respect, to our setup. In our analysis, though, also
the government has private information: interest groups do not know its willingness to
compensate. When we allow for informational linkages between reforms, this assumption,
combined with uncertainty about , provides incentives for governments to use ﬁrst period
compensations as a signaling device. These incentives introduce a further bias against the
implementation of reforms and the payment of compensations. The rest of the paper is
devoted to the analysis of these dynamic mechanisms.
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4 Informational Linkages between Reforms
We now assume that the second interest group can observe the oer made by the government
during the negotiations over the ﬁrst reform. After observing this oer, the second interest
group updates, in a Bayesian fashion, its prior beliefs over the type of government it is
facing.
This game displays two types of equilibria, separating and pooling. In a separating
equilibrium the two types of government oer dierent compensations to an interest group
that decides to enter in the ﬁrst period. Consequently, the second interest group is able
to infer the government’s type and the game in the second period is identical to the one
under public information analyzed in Section 3.1. In a pooling equilibrium, instead, both
types make the same oer. In this case the game in the second period is the same as the
one under no informational linkages and private information about the government’s type
analyzed in Section 3.2.
We cannot rule out the existence of equilibria characterized by an unnatural and un-
realistic path of play. As an example, there exist separating equilibria in which a strong
government signals its type by oering more compensations than it would have oered in
the absence of reputational concerns. These equilibria are supported by out-of-equilibrium
beliefs by the second interest group that place less probability mass on a strong type if
lower compensations are oered. To rule out these equilibria, we restrict the second interest
group’s beliefs to satisfy the following monotonicity property14
Deﬁnition (Monotonic Beliefs). Denote by µ (c) the probability assigned by the second
interest group to a strong government after observing a compensation oer c. The
second interest group has Monotonic Beliefs if, for any pair of ﬁrst period compensation
oers c and c0 such that c0 > c, µ (c)  µ (c0) .
This restriction allows us to prove Lemma 1, which characterizes the oer of a strong
government in every equilibrium of the sequential game.
14This restriction on beliefs has been used, among others, by Coate and Morris (1995).
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Lemma 1. Under informational linkages, in every equilibrium with monotonic beliefs, the
strong government’s ﬁrst period compensation oer does not exceed v/2t.
Proof. By contradiction, consider an equilibrium with monotonic beliefs in which the
strong government’s ﬁrst period oer is cs > v/2t. Denote by cw the weak type’s ﬁrst
period oer in this equilibrium. Consider now a ﬁrst period deviation by the strong
type to v/2t. Monotonicity of beliefs guarantees that the strong type does not incur
any reputational cost by decreasing its ﬁrst period oer, i.e., µ (v/2t)  µ (cs). In a
separating equilibrium, it must be the case that µ (cs) = 1, so that µ (v/2t) = 1. This
implies that a strong type’s expected utility in the second period remains the same
after the deviation. In order to obtain a contradiction it is su!cient to show that the
strong type’s expected utility in the ﬁrst period is higher after the deviation to v/2t.
In a separating equilibrium, in the ﬁrst period, entry is characterized by the set Bcs,cw
and a strong type’s expected utility conditional on entry is proportional to (v  tc) c
for 0  c  cs. It is immediate to check that it is maximized by v/2t, which leads to
the contradiction.
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Figure 3 - Second Period Entry after a Deviation in a Pooling Equilibrium.
Consider now a pooling equilibrium where cw = cs > v/2t and µ (cs) = q. Mono-
tonicity of beliefs implies that µ (v/2t)  q. This, in turn, implies that a strong type’s
expected utility in the second period does not decrease after the deviation. In fact,
after the deviation, second period entry is characterized by the set Bcnls ,cnlw \L, as shown
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in Figure 3 for q < µ (v/2t) < 1,15 where cd = µ (v/2t) cnls +[1 µ (v/2t)] cnlw . A strong
government beneﬁts when entry is characterized by the set Bcnls ,cnlw \L because it im-
plements the reforms associated with interest groups with type (, k) 5 L without
paying compensations. In order to obtain a contradiction it is su!cient to show that
the strong type’s expected utility in the ﬁrst period is higher after the deviation to
v/2t. In a pooling equilibrium, in the ﬁrst period, entry is characterized by the set Acs
and a strong type’s expected utility conditional on entry is proportional to (v  tc) c
for 0  c  cs. As above, it is immediate to check that it is maximized by v/2t, which
leads to the contradiction.
Lemma 1 allows us to concentrate on equilibria in which the strong type oers ﬁrst
period compensations weakly below v/2t. In the following sections, we ﬁrst provide a char-
acterization of the separating and pooling equilibria with monotonic beliefs and then discuss
their general existence.
We denote with primes all variables related to separating equilibria and with double
primes all variables related to pooling equilibria. We also indicate with the letter “c”
compensation oers in equilibrium and with the letter “z” oers that represent the best
deviations from equilibrium.
4.1 Separating Equilibria
Consider a non-trivial separating equilibrium, in which a strong government makes a ﬁrst
period oer c0s < v/2t. It can be supported using the following monotonic beliefs, indexed
by the cut-o compensation level cW: µ (c) = 1 if c  cW and µ (c) = 0 otherwise.
In the ﬁrst round of negotiations, after entry, each government faces the following trade-
o when deciding on compensations: either it oers its short-run optimum, in which case it
will be considered weak by next period’s interest group; or it chooses c  c0s, which is sub-
optimal from a short-run point of view but builds a reputation for being strong, deterring
next period’s entry by some interest group types that otherwise would have organized.16
15 In the case µ (v/2t) = 1, the set Bcs,cw collapses to the set Acs and the same kind of analysis applies.
16Notice that every c < c0s is strictly dominated by c
0
s as a ﬁrst period oer for both types of government.
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In a separating equilibrium where the strong government oers compensations strictly
below v/2t if entry has occurred, less interest groups enter in the ﬁrst period relative to
the case under informational isolation. The weak government plays the myopic optimum.
By the same argument as in Section 3.2, the weak government’s myopic ﬁrst period oer
is then at least as high as cnlw , since the value of the status quo for the marginal interest
group is now even higher. Upon entry, the ﬁrst period oer of a weak government is then
c0w = c
nl
w = 1. In turn, ﬁrst period entry is given by Bc0s = Bc0s,1. Formally, the short-run
cost of oering c for a government of type  , when ﬁrst period entry is given by Bc0s , is
C0
¡
c; c0s
¢
= V W
¡
c0s
¢
 V
¡
c; c0s
¢
where V W (c
0
s) = maxcM[0,1] V (c; c
0
s) . By deﬁnition, C
0
s (z
0
s; c
0
s) = 0 and C
0
w (c
0
w; c
0
s) = 0.
Consider now the second period. In Figure 4, the set N 0 represents interest group types
that decide not to organize if they believe the government is strong rather than weak.
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Figure 4 - Long-Run Gain in Separating Equilibrium.
The long-run gain of being perceived as strong is due to the fact that the reforms
associated with interest groups in the set N 0 do not require any compensation payment to
be implemented. Formally, the long-run gain of being perceived as strong for a government
of type  is
G0 = Pr
³
e2 = 1; c
pb
w
´h
v  V W
³
cpbw
´i
 Pr
³
e2 = 1; c
pb
s
´ h
v  V W
³
cpbs
´i
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where Pr
³
e2 = 1; c
pb

´
is the probability that the second interest group decides to enter
when entry is characterized by the set A
cpb
.
The following incentive compatibility constraints must hold in a separating equilibrium17
C 0w
¡
c0s; c
0
s
¢
 G0w(4)
C0s
¡
c0s; c
0
s
¢
 G0s.
Proposition 3 provides a full characterization of the path of play in separating equilibria.
Proposition 3 (Separating Equilibria). Under “informational linkages”, in every non-
trivial separating equilibria with monotonic beliefs, the unique path of play, indexed by
c0s, is the following. In the First Period:
• only interest groups characterized by (, k) in the set Bc0s choose to organize;
• a strong government oers c0s < v/2t to interest groups that entered and zero
otherwise;
• a weak government oers c0w = 1 to interest groups that entered and zero other-
wise;
• among interest groups that entered, c0s is accepted only by those characterized by
  c0s and c0w = 1 is accepted by all of them.
If the interest group enters in the First Period, then the Second Period path of play is
identical to the one under public information. Otherwise, the Second Period path of
play is identical to the one with no informational linkages.
4.2 Pooling Equilibria
Consider now a pooling equilibrium in which c00s  v/2t. It can be supported using the
following monotonic beliefs, indexed by cW: µ (c) = q if c  cW and µ (c) = 0 otherwise. In
the ﬁrst period of a pooling equilibrium entry is described by the set Ac00s .
18 In equilibrium,
17We assume, without loss of generality, that both the weak and the strong types do not deviate when
indierent.
18Notice that every c < c00s is strictly dominated by c
00
s as a ﬁrst period oer for both types of government,
given monotonic beliefs.
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both types of government play suboptimally from a short-run perspective. Myopically, a
government of type  would have oered z00 , with z00w = 1 and z00s  1 since a weak government
has a greater willingness to compensate. Formally, the short-run cost of oering c for a
government of type  , when ﬁrst period entry is given by Ac00s , is
C 00
¡
c; c00s
¢
= V W
¡
c00s
¢
 V
¡
c; c00s
¢
where V W (c
00
s) = maxcM[0,1] V (c; c
00
s) . Notice that, by deﬁnition, C
00
 (z
00
 ; c
00
s) = 0.
The long-run gain of not being perceived as a weak type is that it discourages some
interest group types from organizing in the second period. In Figure 5, interest group types
in the set N 001 do not organize because expected compensations under no informational
linkages cnl are lower than cpbw .
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Figure 5 - Long-Run Gain from Pooling.
Notice that there is a set of interest group types, N 002 , that would not enter if they knew
that the government was weak, but decide to enter under no informational linkages. They
are characterized by an entry cost k which is slightly larger than their potential loss . The
fact that they can always reject the oer made by the strong type leads them to organize in
order to take advantage of the higher oer of a weak government. However, it can be shown
that the area N 001 is larger than the area N
00
2 , i.e., less interest group types organize under no
informational linkages, and that both types of government enjoy a net beneﬁt from pooling.
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The long-run gain of not being perceived as weak, for a government of type  , is
G00 = Pr
³
e2 = 1; c
pb
w
´ h
v  V W
³
cpbw
´i
 Pr
³
e2 = 1; c
nl
s
´h
v  V W
³
cnls
´i
.
In a pooling equilibrium, both the weak and the strong types choose c00s , i.e., they incur
the short-run cost in order not to be considered weak by the second interest group. The
following incentive compatibility constraints must then be satisﬁed
G00  C
00

¡
c00s ; c
00
s
¢
for  = t, 1.(5)
Proposition 4 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium path of play in pooling
equilibria.
Proposition 4 (Pooling Equilibria). Under “informational linkages”, in every non-trivial
pooling equilibria with monotonic beliefs the unique path of play, indexed by c00s , is the
following. In the First Period:
• only interest groups characterized by (, k) in the set Ac00s choose to organize;
• both government types oer c00s  v/2t to interest groups that entered and zero
otherwise;
• among interest groups that entered, c00s is accepted by those characterized by   c00s
and rejected otherwise.
The Second Period play is identical to the one under no informational linkages.
4.3 Existence
It is relatively easy to verify that a nontrivial separating equilibrium can be supported at
c0s close to v/2t, if  is low enough. The argument relies on the fact that C 0s (v/2t; v/2t) = 0
and hence, by continuity, a strong government is always willing to make a ﬁrst period oer
c0s < v/2t arbitrarily close to v/2t, in order to discourage entry in the future. On the other
hand, if  is low enough, a weak government will attach a higher weight to the short-run
cost of imitating a strong type than to the long-run gain of doing so. It is then possible to
23
ﬁnd  close enough to zero so that a weak government will not be willing to imitate a strong
one by oering c0s arbitrarily close to v/2t.
A nontrivial pooling equilibrium can also be supported at c00s close to v/2t if  and q
are su!ciently high. Again, since C00s (v/2t; v/2t) = 0, it is always going to be incentive-
compatible for a strong government to oer c00s < v/2t arbitrarily close to v/2t. For the
weak government, instead, this requires  to be close enough to 1, so that the discounted
long-run gain from pooling is large. It also requires that q is close enough to 1, so that also
the undiscounted long-run gain from pooling is higher than its short-run cost for a weak
government. If the prior probability that the government is strong is high enough, in fact,
entry in the second period of a pooling equilibrium will be relatively small, and the long-run
gain for a weak type relatively high.
The argument we just outlined provides su!cient conditions on the parameters to ensure
existence of nontrivial pooling or separating equilibria. Unfortunately, it becomes very
complicated to check for existence by analytical methods for a more comprehensive set of
parameter values. It is possible, however, to verify existence numerically for an arbitrarily
dense grid of the whole parameter space. For every point in a grid with as much as 1, 000
values for v,  and q ( did not need to be discretized), we were able to ﬁnd at least either
a separating or a pooling equilibrium. The following claim summarizes our result.19
Claim 1 (General Existence) For every v,  , q and  satisfying Assumptions 4, 2 and 3,
there exists at least one ﬁrst period oer by the strong type that can either be supported as
a separating equilibrium or as a pooling equilibrium with monotonic beliefs.
We now sketch the algorithm we used to check this claim. First, discretize the parameter
space in the v,  and q dimensions. Second, select the triples (v,  , q) that satisfy Assump-
tions 1, 2 and 3. Third, for each admissible triple, select a compensation level c 5 [0, v/2t)
19 In the appendix we list the functions representing the gains and costs for governments of play-
ing their equilibrium strategies. The computer code used to verify this claim can be downloaded from
http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/sceco/castroru .
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and compute the following four threshold discount factors
0s (c) =
C0s (c; c)
G0s
0w (c) =
C0w (c; c)
G0w
00s (c) =
C00s (c; c)
G00s
00w (c) =
C00w (c; c)
G00w
.
Together with the incentive compatible constraints (4) and (5), these four numbers deﬁne
a region of discount factors in the interval [0, 1] where equilibria can be supported. Fourth,
keep searching for alternative compensation levels until the union of all such regions of
discount factors coincides with [0, 1]. The claim is veriﬁed if for no admissible triple (v,  , q)
all possible compensation oers are exhausted without covering the whole interval [0, 1] .
5 The Eect of Reputation on Reforms and Compensations
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the eects of informational linkages between
negotiation rounds on the implementation of reforms and the payment of compensations.
Speciﬁcally, we compare the path of play of separating and pooling equilibria with monotonic
beliefs with the unique path of play of the game under informational isolation.
One approach would be to consider each combination of government and interest group
types and check whether a reform is implemented or not under informational isolation and
informational linkages, in a given period and a given equilibrium. The conclusion of such
analysis would be ambiguous: in some cases, informational linkages imply that a reform
fails to be implemented; however, the opposite situation may also occur.
We thus choose to provide a synthetic measure of the frequency at which reform imple-
mentation should be observed. The measure we adopt is the ex-ante probability - computed
with respect to the prior distributions of  and (, k) - of implementing a reform in a given
equilibrium and a given period of the game. We use the same criterion to evaluate the
compensations paid in equilibrium. Proposition 5 summarizes our results.
Proposition 5. Under “informational linkages”, in all the non-trivial separating equilibria
with monotonic beliefs, when compared with the game under “informational isolation”:
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• the ex-ante probability of implementing the ﬁrst reform is strictly lower;
• expected compensations paid in the ﬁrst period are strictly lower;
• the ex-ante probability of implementing the second reform is strictly lower if q <
qW for some 0 < qW  1;
• expected compensations paid in the second period are strictly lower if q < qWW for
some 0 < qWW  1.
In all the pooling equilibria with monotonic beliefs, when compared with the game under
“informational isolation”:
• the ex-ante probability of implementing the ﬁrst reform is strictly lower;
• expected compensations paid in the ﬁrst period are strictly lower;
• expected compensations paid and the ex-ante probability of implementing the sec-
ond reform do not change.
As Proposition 5 shows, reputational concerns induce strong governments to reduce
compensations oers in the ﬁrst period of separating equilibria, thereby decreasing the
probability of implementing the ﬁrst reform. Figure 6 compares the equilibrium path of
play in the ﬁrst period of a separating equilibrium with the one under no informational
linkages.
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Figure 6 - First Period of a Separating Equilibrium versus No Informational Linkages.
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Notice that the reforms associated with interest group types in the trapezoid I are not
implemented under informational linkages if the government is strong.20
Reputational concerns also produce a similar bias in the oer of weak governments in
the ﬁrst period of pooling equilibria. Figure 7 compares the ﬁrst period of a pooling equilib-
rium when both government types choose c00s = v/2t with the game under no informational
linkages.
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Figure 7 - First Period of a Pooling Equilibrium versus No Informational Linkages.
Interest group types that reject the weak government’s oer in the ﬁrst period of a
pooling equilibrium are denoted by the trapezoid I1. The reforms associated with these
interest groups therefore fail to be implemented. Notice, however, that in this pooling
equilibrium ﬁrst period entry is lower than under informational isolation, due to the fact
that the weak type oers less compensations. This eect tends to increase the chances of
implementing the ﬁrst reform if the government is strong because interest group types in
the triangle I2 do not organize in the ﬁrst period of a pooling equilibrium. However, it can
be shown that the ﬁrst eect dominates the second one.
The second period path of play in a pooling equilibrium is obviously identical to the
one under informational isolation. Interestingly, signalling by a strong type in the ﬁrst
period of a separating equilibrium does not necessarily translate into a higher probability
20Notice that the fact that some interest group types decide not to enter in the ﬁrst period of a separating
equilibrium, while they would have entered under informational isolation, does not aect this conclusion. In
fact all these types would have accepted both governments’ oers under informational isolation.
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of implementing the second reform. By signalling its type a strong government discourages
some interest group types from organizing in the second period, and therefore increases the
probability of implementing the second reform at no cost. However, it also induces some
interest group types, characterized by relatively low ’s and that otherwise would not have
organized, to do so in order to extract compensations from a weak government. Following
this dierent entry pattern, a weak government reduces its compensation oer with respect
to the game under informational isolation, thereby reducing the probability of implementing
the second reform. Therefore, if q is not too high, the eect associated with the weak type
prevails and the ex-ante probability of implementing the second reform decreases in the
second period of a separating equilibrium.
6 An Example: The Peace Process in Colombia
In order to illustrate how our story may help understand real world reform processes, we
describe in some detail the peace negotiations undertaken by the President of Colombia,
Andres Pastrana, since his election in June of 1998, with two left-wing guerrilla groups,
the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation
Army).
For almost four decades these guerrilla groups have been waging a war against Colombia’s
government that left tens of thousands of people dead. In the aftermath of his election
Pastrana initiated formal peace talks with the FARC, after agreeing to demilitarize a large
(16,000 square miles) area of southern Colombia. The FARC thus obtained total control over
an area which has approximately the size of Switzerland, without being subject to any kind
of monitoring by neutral observers. When Pastrana turned to the ELN to initiate formal
talks, the latter demanded pre-conditions similar to the ones already granted to the FARC.
As The Economist (July 29th, 2000) puts it: “the ELN will not negotiate until a safe haven
is cleared and secured.” In order to put pressure on the government, the ELN organized,
during the course of 1999, the mass kidnapping of people during a mass, the hijacking of a
plane and the blowing of electricity pylons. Until recently Pastrana’s government has been
28
reluctant to concede a safe haven to the ELN, partly because it is militarily less powerful
than the FARC and partly because the FARC has been using its enclave to empower itself. In
recent talks with the ELN, held in July 2000 in Geneva, Switzerland, Colombia’s government
agreed to grant the ELN an area of approximately 1,800 square miles. To date, however,
no agreement has been reached between the two parts.
How does our model provide intuition into this reform process? The beginning of formal
negotiations with each of the two guerrilla groups represents, in the language of our paper, a
reform. Each reform would bring about a net gain for the country as a whole, by increasing
the chances of ending the civil war and also, in the short-run, by reducing the amount of
political violence and instability.
In terms of our theory, the dynamics of reform in Colombia can be interpreted as the path
of play of a separating equilibrium when the government is weak. Pastrana’s government
began formal negotiations with the FARC by oering the latter a “compensation package”
that included the demilitarization of a vast area of the country. When the government
faced the second reform, i.e., inducing the ELN to sit at the bargaining table, it faced a
guerrilla group that was not willing to negotiate before obtaining a safe haven like the one
already granted to the FARC. The second interest group observed the outcome of the ﬁrst
negotiation stage and inferred that it could obtain a similar transfer from Pastrana’s “weak”
government. The ELN ﬁts our description of an interest group with a low evaluation of the
status quo (small ) that decides to organize mainly with the purpose of obtaining a transfer
from a weak government. The ELN is in fact smaller and militarily weaker than the FARC
and “unlike the FARC (...), the ELN seems positively eager for peace” (The Economist,
January 29th, 2000). The “organization” of this second interest group came in the form of
mass kidnapping and blowing of electricity pylons, which were meant to signal the ELN’s
willingness to ﬁght for the land transfer.
The government’s initial attitude toward the ELN’s claim was negative, to the point that
The Economist (January 29th, 2000) wrote that “unless the ELN drops its demand for a
haven in southern Bolivar, the prospects for a second set of peace talks are likely to remain
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dark.” However, after some months of uncertainty and lack of resolve, the government
ﬁnally agreed to grant the ELN its safe haven. The ELN is thus likely to end up obtaining
a transfer from the Colombian government that it might not have received in the absence of
informational linkages across reforms, consistently with our model. In this case, the second
reform is also likely to be implemented, but the second guerilla group obtains a higher share
of the total surplus compared to the game under no informational linkages
The Colombian peace process exempliﬁes two important points that we have stressed in
this paper: 1) It is di!cult for governments to commit to certain policies: Pastrana’s attitude
toward granting a safe haven to the ELN changed after this group staged its mass kidnapping
campaign. 2) When reforms are implemented sequentially a government’s reputation has
an important impact on interest groups’ decisions to organize and take action. We should
thus expect governments to take the sequentiality of the reform process into account when
bargaining with interest groups.
While especially suggestive, the Colombian example is not unique. Another interesting
case, which we do not explore in detail here, concerns the negotiations between several
Italian governments and trade unions over labor market reforms in the last twenty years or
so. There the political fragmentation of the unions created a setting where a government’s
reputational concerns were of primary importance when dealing with these interest groups.
7 Concluding Remarks
Understanding why e!ciency-enhancing reforms are not implemented is a key problem in
political economy. Every answer to this question has to provide an explanation for why
payments of compensations to losers of reforms are not carried out when they are feasible.
This paper deals with this issue by explicitly formalizing some of the transaction costs that
make the payment of compensations problematic. Speciﬁcally, in our model losers from
reforms have private information about their evaluation of the status quo and compensations
are distortionary. Therefore, governments will in general not ﬁnd it optimal to always
compensate them. More interestingly, in our environment the formation of interest groups
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is endogenous and depends on expected compensations. When reforms are sequential and
governments dier according to their willingness to make transfers, current compensations
may be used to discourage the formation of interest groups in the future. This will result
in a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms.
It is important to point out that we have summarized the eects of this dynamic mech-
anism in terms of a measure of the expected number of reforms that are not implemented,
rather than in terms of a measure of its welfare cost. The discussion at the beginning of
Section 5 suggests that, even though less reforms are implemented on average under infor-
mational linkages, it may be the case that the welfare cost associated with the reforms that
fail to be implemented is smaller than the welfare beneﬁt generated by the ones that are.
In this sense, we cannot rule out that signaling could be welfare-enhancing in some cases.
Lastly, this paper has stressed the idea that some aspects of political reality, such as
sequentiality of bargaining between governments and interest groups, may lead to ine!cient
outcomes. An important direction for future research is therefore to study and compare
alternative institutional frameworks from an e!ciency point of view.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In Section 3.1, we have shown that entry by interest groups must be
characterized by the set Ac . To complete the proof it is enough to solve the government’s
problem (1) when entry is given by Ac and to show that c
pb
 (c

 ) = c

 i c = cpb = v/2 .
The optimal choice for c  c is v/2 . Also, it is immediate to see that the optimal choice for
c  c is given by c implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition
2c (v  c) 
³
c2 + (c )
2
´
= 0
and such that the second order condition v3c < 0 is satisﬁed. Moreover, when c = c = cpb
in the preceding ﬁrst order condition it is easy to check that cpb = v/2 . This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. In Section 3.2, we have shown that entry by interest groups must be
characterized by the set Bc
s
,c
w
. To complete the proof it is enough to solve the government’s
problem (3) when entry is given by Bc
s
,c
w
and to show that cnl (c

s , c

w) = c

 for  = t, 1 i
cnls = c

s =
v
2t
cnlw = c

w = min
(
v
4 q
Ã
1 +
r
1
q (4 q)
4t2
!
, 1
)
.(6)
Consider ﬁrst a strong government. For c  cs, the optimal choice of c is cs . For cs  c  1,
the optimal choice is given by c implicitly deﬁned by
t
³
cc +
q
2
(c cs)
2
´
+ (v  tc) (c + q (c cs)) = 0(7)
and such that the second order condition
2t (c + q (c cs)) + q (v  tc) < 0
is satisﬁed. Moreover, evaluating (7) at c = cs, as equilibrium requires, it is easy to check
that the solution is cnls = v/2t. For c

w  c  1 the optimal choice is given by cw be-
cause CVs (c; cs , cw) /Cc < 0 for c  cw. Since Vs (c; cs, cw) is continuous at c = cw it fol-
lows that Vs
¡
cnls ; c

s, c

w
¢
> Vs (cw; c

s , c

w) for all c

s, c

w. Thus, in equilibrium, c
nl
s = v/2t =
argmaxc Vs (c; c

s, c

w) .
Consider now a weak government. For c  cs, since CVw (c; cs, cw) /Cc > 0, its optimal choice
is cs . For c

s  c  cw, the optimal choice is given by c implicitly deﬁned by

³
cc +
q
2
(c cs)
2
´
+ (v  c) (c + q (c cs)) = 0(8)
and such that the second order condition
2 (c + q (c cs)) + q (v  c) < 0
is satisﬁed. Moreover, when c = cw and c

s = v/2t in (8), it is easy to check that the solution
is cnlw = c

w as in (6). Finally, for c

w  c, the optimal interior choice is given by c implicitly
deﬁned by
1
2
¡
1 
¡
c2 + 1
¢¢
+ (v  c)c = 0
33
and such that the second order condition v  3c < 0 is satisﬁed. It is easy to check that the
solution is cnlw = c

w. Notice that a weak government gets higher utility when it chooses c
nl
w
than when it chooses cs. This claim follows from the fact that Vw (c; c

s, c

w) is continuous at
cs and
lim
c$(c
s
)+
CVw (c; cs, cw)
Cc
= c (v  2cs) > 0
since cs < v/2. Thus Vw
¡
cnlw ; c

s, c

w
¢
> Vw (c

s; c

s, c

w) for all c

s, c

w and so c
nl
w = c

w =
argmaxc Vw (c; c

s, c

w) . This completes the proof.
Claim 1. In order to verify the existence result of this claim, we used the following functions
representing the short-run costs and the long-run gains in the separating and pooling equilibria:
G0w =
1
2
·
v  1
³ v
2t
´2¸
C0w (c; c) = (v  1) 2 (v  c) c
qc+ (1 q)
1 + qc2 + (1 q)
G0s =
³v
2
´3 t 1
t
C0s (c; c) = 2 (v  tz
0
s)
z0s (qc+ 1 q) +
q
2 (z
0
s  c)
2
1 + qc2 + (1 q)
 2 (v  tc) c
qc+ 1 q
1 + qc2 + (1 q)
G00w =
1
2
½
v  2 + q
·
1
³ v
2t
´2¸¾
C00w (c; c) = (v  1) 2 (v  c)
c2
1 + c2
G00s =
v
2
·³v
2
´2µ t 1
t
¶
 (1 q)
³
1
v
2t
´¸
C00s (c; c) = (v  tz
00
s )
c2 + (z00s )
2
1 + c2
 2 (v  tc)
c2
1 + c2
where the best unilateral deviations for a strong government in the separating and pooling
equilibria are given respectively by
z0s = min
;
?
=
qv  2t (1 q) +
q
(qv  2t (1 q))2  6qt
¡
tq
2 c
2  v (1 q)
¢
3qt
, 1
<
@
>
z00s = min
;
?
=
v +
q
v2  3 (tc)2
3t
, 1
<
@
> .
Proof of Proposition 5.
1 Separating Equilibria.
1.1 First Period.
1.1.1 Ex-Ante Probability. The ex-ante probability of implementing a reform in the game
under no informational linkages is given by
pnl = q
µ
cnls +
1
2
(1 cnls )
¡
1 cnl
¢¶
+ (1 q) cnlw .
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The ex-ante probability of implementing a reform in the ﬁrst period of a separating equilibrium
is, instead, given by
p01 = q
µ
c0s +
1
2
(1 c0s) (1 c
0)
¶
+ (1 q) c0w
where
c¯0 = qc0s + (1 q) c0w.
We need to prove that p01 < p
nl. Keeping into account that cnlw = c
0
w = 1 and that c
nl
s = v/2t,
this is equivalent to showing that
c0s +
q
2
(1 c0s)
2
<
v
2t
+
q
2
³
1
v
2t
´2
.
It is easy to see that this is true if and only if c0s < v/2t.
1.1.2. Expected Compensations. Deﬁne the function f (.) as
f (c) = qc2 [1 q (1 c)] + (1 q)
h
1
q
2
¡
1 c2
¢i
.
We need to prove that expected compensations under informational isolation, f (v/2t) , are
higher than in the ﬁrst period of a separating equilibrium, f(c0s). This is true if and only if
c0s < v/2t because the function f(.) is increasing in c.
1.2 Second Period.
1.2.1 Ex-Ante Probability. Let p02 represent the probability of implementing the second reform
in a separating equilibrium:
p02 =
q
2
³
1 +
¡
cpbs
¢2´
+
(1 q)
2
³
1 +
¡
cpbw
¢2´
,
with cpbs = v/2t and c
pb
w = v/2. We need to show that there exists a 0 < q
  1 such that for
q < q, it is true that p02 < p
nl. Consider pnlp02 as a function of q. This is a convex parabola
with zeroes at q = 1 and bq deﬁned as
bq  1 ¡v2¢2
(1 v2t)2
.
If bq > 1, then let q = 1: we would have shown that pnl  p02 > 0 for every q. If bq < 1, let
q = bq, and we have pnl  p02 > 0 only for q < q.
1.2.2 Expected Compensations. We need to show that there exists a 0 < q  1 such that
for q < q expected compensations paid in the second period of a separating equilibrium are
lower than the ones paid under no informational linkages. Expected compensations in the
second period of a separating equilibrium are given by:
q
³ v
2t
´3
+ (1 q)
³v
2
´3
.
Expected compensation in the game under no informational linkages are f(v/2t), where the
function f(.) has been deﬁned above. We need to show that
q
³ v
2t
´2 h
1 q
³
1
v
2t
´i
+ (1 q)
·
1
q
2
µ
1
³ v
2t
´2¶¸
> q
³ v
2t
´3
+ (1 q)
³v
2
´3
.
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Rearranging this inequality one gets
q
2
³
1
v
2t
´·
2
³ v
2t
´2

³
1 +
v
2t
´¸
+ 1
³v
2
´3
> 0.
If the term in square brackets of this equation is positive, let q = 1: expected compensations
in the second period of a separating equilibrium are always lower than under informational
isolation in this case. Otherwise, deﬁne
eq = 2
h
1
¡
v
2
¢3i¡
1 v2t
¢ h¡
1 + v2t
¢
 2
¡
v
2t
¢2i
and let q = eq. In this case expected compensations in the second period of a separating
equilibrium are lower than under informational isolation only if q < eq.
2 Pooling Equilibria.
2.1 First Period.
2.1.1 Ex-Ante Probability. Let p001 represent the ex-ante probability of implementing a reform
in the ﬁrst period of a pooling equilibrium:
p001 =
1
2
³
1 + (c00s )
2
´
.
We need to show that p001 < p
nl. This is equivalent to showing that
c00s +
1
2
(1 c00s )
2
< q
·
v
2t
+
q
2
³
1
v
2t
´2¸
+ 1 q
for c00s < v/2t. To verify that this is true, notice that the left-hand side of this equation is
increasing in c00s , so that it is enough to verify the inequality at c
00
s = v/2t:
v
2t
+
1
2
³
1
v
2t
´2
 q
h v
2t
+
q
2
(1
v
2t
)2
i
+ 1 q.
For q = 1 the two sides of this equation coincide. Moreover, the right-hand side decreases in
q, so that for q < 1 it is strictly above the left-hand side.
2.1.2 Expected Compensations. Expected compensations paid in the ﬁrst period of the pool-
ing equilibrium are just (c00s )
3
. The expected amount of compensations paid in the game under
no informational linkages is f(v/2t), where the function f(.) has been deﬁned above. Consider
the limit-case where c00s = v/2t. It is then su!cient to show that:
q
³ v
2t
´3
+ (1 q)
³ v
2t
´3
< q
³ v
2t
´2 h
1 q
³
1
v
2t
´i
+ (1 q)
·
1
q
2
µ
1
³ v
2t
´2¶¸
.
Rearranging this inequality we obtain
q
³ v
2t
´2 h
(1 q)
³
1
v
2t
´i
+ (1 q)
·³
1
q
2
´

³ v
2t

q
2
´³ v
2t
´2¸
> 0
where both the ﬁrst and the second terms are positive because v < 2t.
2.2 Second Period. The second period path of play of a pooling equilibrium is identical to the
one under no informational linkages.
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